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Reaching India’s Renewable Energy Targets Cost-
Effectively: A Foreign Exchange Hedging Facility
Arsalan Ali Farooquee and Gireesh Shrimali
Abstract
A major barrier to deploying renewable energy in India is a shortage of debt at attractive terms. Domestic debt 
in India has high cost, short tenor, and variable interest rates, adding 30% to the cost of renewable energy. 
Currently foreign debt is as expensive as domestic debt because it requires market-based foreign exchange 
hedging solutions. This paper investigates a government-sponsored foreign exchange facility as an alternative 
way for facilitating provision of foreign debt at attractive terms. We use a representative stochastic model of 
the INR-USD foreign exchange rate. We find that the expected cost to provide a 10-year currency hedge via 
a government-sponsored foreign exchange facility is 3.5 percentage points, which is 50% lower than the cost 
of a market hedge. We also find that this facility has the potential to reduce the cost of renewable energy by 
up to 19% and the cost of government support by up to 54%. However, these benefits come with a caveat: the 
government should manage the risks related to unexpected and extreme currency movements appropriately. 
One option to manage these risks is via a capital buffer, which we explicitly model. We find that, for the 
facility to achieve India’s current sovereign rating, the cumulative capital buffer would be almost 30% of the 
underlying loan. Finally, using option theory, we calculate the market cost of maintaining this capital buffer, 
which largely explains the difference between the market cost of hedging and the expected cost of hedging 
from this facility.
Keywords: currency hedging, renewable energy, foreign exchange risk, capital buffer
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1. Introduction
India has ambitious renewable energy targets for 2022.1 However because of the government’s limited budget, 
a cost-effective policy path is crucial to achieving those targets. Achieving India’s renewable energy targets 
cost-effectively faces two key barriers – a shortage of debt and inferior terms of debt (CPI, 2012). 
The estimated availability of private capital for infrastructure investment during the 12th Five Year Plan is 
27% lower than what’s required (RBI, 2012). In addition, inferior terms of domestic debt, specifically high 
cost, short tenor, and variable interest rates, increase the cost of renewable energy in India by 30% compared 
to the US (CPI, 2012). This directly increases the cost of government support. More debt at attractive terms, 
specifically reduced cost, extended tenor debt, is needed to achieve India’s renewable energy targets. 
Domestic loans in India are expensive, typically costing more than 12% per year (CPI, 2012). In addition, 
these loans tend to be for shorter terms, and have variable interest rates. Foreign loans may be attractive for 
Indian policymakers, given that cheaper, longer-term, fixed-rate foreign loans have the potential to reduce the 
cost of renewable energy and, therefore, the cost of government support (CPI, 2012; CPI, 2014). 
However, when a renewable energy project is financed by a foreign loan, the mismatch in the underlying 
currency of debt obligations (for example, USD) and currency of revenue (for example, INR) exposes the 
project to the risk of devaluation in the latter, necessitating the use of a currency hedge to protect against these 
devaluations.2 
Hedging exposure in financial markets in India is expensive, and the high costs of hedging almost entirely 
negate the benefit of cheaper foreign borrowings. The typical cost of currency hedging in India is around 7% 
per year (Bloomberg terminal3), which makes a fully hedged foreign loan nearly as expensive as domestic 
loans (CPI, 2012). 
Reducing the cost of foreign debt, by reducing the currency hedging cost, can mobilize foreign capital and 
spur investments in renewable energy by reducing the cost of capital. This would then reduce the delivered 
cost of renewable energy,4 making renewable energy more competitive with electricity generated from fossil 
fuels (CPI, 2012); as well as reduce the government cost of support (CPI, 2014). 
The Government of India has realized the role cheaper currency hedging mechanisms can play in expanding 
renewable energy capacity. The government has shown interest in providing cheaper currency hedging for 
renewable energy using funds from the National Clean Energy Fund.5 Subsequent government announcements 
have discussed the initial design of a hedging facility.6 
1 The government of India has recently revised the renewable energy targets to 160GW of solar and wind energy capacity by 
2022. This is more than six times the current installed renewable energy capacity of 23GW.
2 In theory, INR has a market-determined exchange rate. However, RBI can intervene actively in cases of excessive volatility 
(HSBC, 2012).
3 Last accessed in January 2015
4 For this paper, delivered cost of renewable energy includes the per unit generation (only) cost to the consumer. In most cases, 
this is the same as the levelized cost, which is the per unit revenue required for a project to be viable; however, in some cases, 
it may include surcharges.
5  See http://www.livemint.com/Politics/ZfmQqAhTj0YR6epa7DS53J/India-may-leverage-clean-energy-fund-to-hedge-foreign-
loans.html?utm_source=copy  
6 See http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/power/power-minister-piyush-goyal-eyes-bidding-in-dollar-to-cut-
solar-tariff/articleshow/46684838.cms 
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Given that government policies can influence currency rates, there is an argument for governments providing 
a currency hedging solution in strategic situations. Macroeconomic conditions are primary drivers of foreign 
exchange rates (IDBI, 2006), and most macroeconomic conditions can be influenced by government policies. 
Given that governments may be in the best position to bear (and respond to) currency risk, they can choose to 
bear this risk in certain strategic situations, such as deployment of renewable energy.
Another argument for the Indian government providing currency hedging is that bearing the currency risk for 
renewable energy offsets the risk the government (and the economy as a whole) takes on the currency risk 
related to future imported fossil-fuel purchases. This is particularly relevant for imported coal, which is the 
marginal fossil fuel that additional renewable energy is likely to replace (CPI, 2015). 
However, the hedging proposals that the government has announced so far do not fully assess the risks 
associated with foreign exchange rate hedging adequately. These proposals discuss the average rate the INR 
has depreciated against the USD, and propose a facility that addresses this average depreciation. But currency 
movements can be unexpected and uncertain.7 
This requires an in-depth assessment of not only the expected cost of providing such a hedging facility but 
also the risk implications. We do so by using a representative probabilistic model to model future foreign 
exchange rate movement; however, with the caveat that our results only provide an insight into various aspects 
of designing an FXHF, and a more detailed design would require in-depth modelling in collaboration with 
industry and academic experts.
2. A foreign exchange hedging facility (FXHF)
A government-sponsored FXHF (“the FXHF”) could be a cheaper mechanism which could effectively 
support hedging of currency risk. The FXHF would provide hedging for expected currency depreciation and 
unexpected and extreme currency depreciation separately, hence providing greater control over risk exposure 
and risk assessment than hedging in the market. 
Under the FXHF, the government can provide project developers or off-takers (for example, public distribution 
companies) protection from currency risk through a standalone fund. The cash flows under the FXHF depend 
on whether the project’s power purchase agreement (PPA) is based on local currency (INR) or hard currency 
(USD). Both of these models are described below.
2.1 An FXHF for a local currency power purchase agreement
Under a local currency power purchase agreement, the power purchase agreement is denominated in local 
currency, and the project developer borrows in foreign currency; therefore, the foreign exchange risk exposure 
is borne by the project developer. In this case, the FXHF can enter into a swap – contract for differences 
(CFD)8 – with the project developer with exposure to currency risk. 
7 Forecasting exchange rates in a deterministic manner is not easy because each of the existing exchange rate theories holds 
only in specific settings and explains only specific macroeconomic phenomena. No single theory contains all the factors that 
may have an impact on foreign exchange rates (ADBI, 2006).
8 The FX risk exposure of the project developer can be fixed at a pre-determined level beyond which FXHF will cover the risk 
by paying cash to the project developer. The frequency of this payment would be similar to debt payment obligations of the 
project developer.
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Under a contract for differences, the two parties would sign a contract at a fixed foreign exchange rate and 
exchange payments for the differences between the actual and the contract foreign exchange rates. For example, 
if the fixed rate is 1 USD = 63 INR, then, at fixed periods when debt payments are due (yearly or quarterly), if 
the foreign exchange rate is higher than 1 USD = 63 INR, the FXHF would make a net payment to the project 
developer. Otherwise, the project developer would make a net payment to the FXHF.
The following flow-chart depicts the flow of payments for an FXHF for a local currency power purchase 
agreement:
2.2 An FXHF for a hard currency power purchase agreement
Under a hard currency power purchase agreement, the power purchase agreement is denominated in a hard 
currency such as USD or Euro, and the off-taker is exposed to the foreign exchange risk. Since it may be 
politically difficult to pass the full foreign exchange risk to the customers,9  a hard currency power purchase 
agreement could put severe strain on off-takers – in particular, distribution companies – if the foreign 
exchange risk is not adequately covered, especially because of the poor financial health of Indian distribution 
companies.10 In this case, the foreign exchange risk is taken by the off-taker, or the distribution company, and 
hence the FXHF will enter into a contract for differences with the off-taker instead of the project developer. 
9 Hard currency PPAs didn’t work well in extreme stress situations as experienced in Indonesia and Argentina as these 
governments refused to increase tariffs to match currency depreciation against the USD. India experimented with such a tariff 
mechanism unsuccessfully with a combined cycle gas plant in 1997 (GVK Industries’ 217 MW (Phase 1) in Jegurupadu, 
Andhra Pradesh (CPI, 2014(b)).
10 http://natgrp.org/2013/07/13/accumulated-losses-of-state-power-utilities-as-on-2013/ 
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The following flow-chart depicts the flow of payments for a hard currency power purchase agreement:
2.3 Design considerations for an FXHF
The design of the FXHF would remain the same under both a local currency and hard currency power purchase 
agreement. Only the counterparty (the entity entering into the contract for differences) would be different. 
Under a local currency power purchase agreement, the counterparty would be the project developer; while 
under a hard currency power purchase agreement, the counterparty would be the off-taker. 
However, designing the facility would be a large undertaking, given that currency movements can be uncertain 
and volatile. The design of the FXHF requires detailed analysis of the following: 
 • Expected cost: The expected net payments by the FXHF. This would be the net present value of the 
difference between the variable INR payments from the FXHF to the counterparty and the fixed INR 
payments from the counterparty to the FXHF.
 • Risk exposure: The different risks – explicit and implicit – that the FXHF may face. In particular, the 
FXHF may face the risk of unexpected and extreme movements in the foreign exchange rate.
 • Capital buffer: The amount required, beyond expected cost, to address unexpected and extreme 
movements in the foreign exchange rate. This buffer would ensure that, given a particular probability 
of default, the FXHF does not run out of money.
 • Size: The total size of the FXHF, which is the sum of the expected cost and the capital buffer. This is 
the size of the FXHF required to ensure that the FXHF not only takes care of the expected cost but also 
provides the capital buffer for unexpected and extreme movements.
FX
HEDGING 
FACILITY
UTILITY
(OFF-TAKER)
CONSUMER PROJECTDEVELOPER
FOREIGN 
LENDER/ 
FOREIGN DEBT 
HOLDERS
Fixed INR 
payments
Variable 
INR 
payments
Fixed INR 
payments
Fixed USD 
payments 
(PPA)
Fixed USD 
payments
 6Technical Paper
Reaching India’s Renewable Energy Targets Cost-Effectively:  A Foreign Exchange Hedging FacilityJune 2015
All of these require forecasting foreign exchange rates. In Section 3, we forecast long-term foreign exchange 
rates using annual foreign exchange time series data,11 and a representative stochastic model, where the 
forecasted values have associated probabilities. In Section 4, based on the expected foreign exchange rates, 
we calculate the expected cost of currency hedging, the impact of FXHF on the delivered cost of renewable 
energy, and the cost of support for the government. In Section 5, we use different probability levels of foreign 
exchange rate forecasts to assess the risk exposure of the FXHF, and to estimate the capital buffer. Finally, 
we calculate the cost of maintaining the capital buffer or the market risk covered by the capital buffer using 
option pricing theory. 
We note that this work is preliminary, and the final design of the FXHF would involve further detailed analysis. 
We also note our implicit assumptions: first, it is possible to forecast foreign exchange rates in a stochastic 
manner; and second, it is possible to not only provide a hedging solution with an expected cost but also 
to design a robust FXHF using an appropriate capital buffer. We understand that these assumptions can be 
challenged; however, the purpose of our analysis is meant just to provide insights into the design of an FXHF.
3. Forecasting foreign exchange rate 
A deterministic model for a foreign exchange forecast is based on several economic and non-economic 
variables; such models forecast a single foreign exchange value for a particular point in time in the future. 
Different exchange rate theories are used as foundations for deterministic models (ADBI, 2006).12 These 
include partial equilibrium models, general equilibrium models, and hybrid models. Each theory holds in a 
particular context and explains some macroeconomic conditions. However, no single theory comprehensively 
explains currency movements (ADBI, 2006). Therefore, a deterministic model for foreign exchange rate 
forecasting can easily go wrong.
To overcome these difficulties with deterministic models, we used a stochastic model to forecast the long-term 
foreign exchange rate based on historic data. A stochastic model considers cumulative (or combined) effects 
of multiple uncertainties (over the variables discussed above) on the foreign exchange rate. Thus, a stochastic 
model is a better representation of the movement of foreign exchange rates compared to deterministic models, 
and these models are regularly used in the market to price foreign exchange swaps and options. However, one 
caveat is that such a model is still not perfect as it is derived from historical data over a certain time period (in 
our case 1995-2014), while foreign exchange fluctuations can result from future (and unexpected) political 
and macroeconomic events which this particular historical data may not reflect, such as sovereign default.
Our long-term INR-USD exchange rate forecast involves the following steps: first, choosing an appropriate 
stochastic model; second, determining the key parameters of the stochastic model; and third, using the 
stochastic model to forecast the INR-USD exchange rate, using Monte-Carlo simulations.
11 This is for demonstration purposes only.  Quarterly data can be used to match the actual flows from the FXHF, based on loan 
repayment profiles.
12 These models include the following (ADBI, 2006):
• Partial equilibrium models are single factor models. These include: (relative or absolute) power purchase parity (PPP), 
which considers only the goods market; (covered or uncovered) interest rate parity, which considers (only) the assets 
market; and the external equilibrium model, which considers only the balance of payments.
• General equilibrium models are more complex models. These include: the Mundell-Fleming model, which considers the 
equilibrium of the goods market, money market and balance of payments; the Balassa-Samuelson model, which considers 
maximization of firms’ profits; the pricing to market model, which considers maximization of consumers’ utilities; and the 
Redux model, which was developed by Obestfeld and Rogoff.
• Hybrid models, such as the Dornbusch model, are obtained by combining the monetary equilibrium with the adjustment of 
prices outputs toward their long run equilibrium, and can be called hybrids of monetary equilibrium with purchase power 
(or interest rate) parity.
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3.1 Geometric Brownian motion
As the first step, we chose the geometric Brownian motion (GBM) as an appropriate stochastic model, based 
on its properties of log-normal distribution of returns13 and a Markov process. Under a GBM, the foreign 
exchange rate is characterized by a trend (deterministic) component and a random (stochastic) component.  
Representing a foreign exchange rate with a GBM is based on the assumption that the logarithmic returns 
are normally distributed. That is, the underlying assumption is that all the uncertainties affecting the foreign 
exchange rates are not only independent but also none of them are dominant. This assumption may be violated 
in reality, given that many of the uncertainties that affect foreign exchange rate, including government policies, 
may not satisfy these conditions. Other stochastic processes have been suggested as alternatives.
Despite this, GBM provides a reasonable, first-order, approximation to exchange rate movements, and has been 
extensively used for modelling purposes in not only academia but also in the finance industry. For example, 
in the exchange rate market, vanilla (the simplest) foreign exchange option prices are generally quoted using 
the Black-Scholes framework, which is based on a GBM. Also, the currency option pricing model proposed 
by Heston (1993) is based on a GBM. Hence, a GBM provides a suitable representative process for foreign 
exchange forecast modelling.
The following stochastic differential equation represents a GBM for a foreign exchange rate:
where μ is the drift rate and σ is the standard deviation, µStdt is the trend (deterministic) component and σStdWt 
is the stochastic (random) component. The solution of equation (I) gives the following process representing a 
foreign exchange rate:
where FXt is the foreign exchange rate at time t, FXo is the foreign exchange rate at time t= to, and Wt is a 
Weiner process. In equation (II),  (µ-σ2/2)t represents the trend component and σ*Wt represents the stochastic 
component of the foreign exchange rate movements. Wt can be further written as:
where Z is normally distributed random number between 0 and 1.
13 GBM implies that returns have a lognormal distribution; that is, the logarithmic returns have a normal distribution. Since a 
lognormal distribution prohibits negative values, a GBM can overestimate extreme depreciation in FX rates.
dS S dt S dWtt t t= +n v
 (I)
 
[( /2)t *W ]FX FX exp tot 2 +n v v= -
(II)
 
*W Z tt =
(III)
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3.2 Extracting μ and σ for a GBM: The maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) 
To use a GBM for forecasting purposes, we need to estimate two key parameters of the GBM – the μ and σ. 
μ can be derived from historical values of foreign exchange rates or from inflation (or interest rate) differential. 
However, deriving μ from inflation differential would lean towards theories of a partial equilibrium model, 
which don’t appear to hold for the INR-USD exchange rate. σ can be taken either as a constant or be modelled 
as a dynamic function of time (Heston, 1993). However, it is not uncommon to take implied volatility as a 
constant – for example, while pricing vanilla foreign exchange options. 
We assumed that a historical foreign exchange rate time series can provide reliable estimates of trend and 
random components in the foreign exchange rate movements. Therefore, the key parameters for the GBM 
were estimated from the history of the INR-USD foreign exchange rate. 
To find μ and σ that yield the best fit to any historical dataset, we used maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) 
– that is, we derived the most likely parameters of a GBM that would represent this dataset. The following 
closed form expressions for the mean and variance of the log returns samples xi = log FXti − log FXti-1, were 
used as the MLE estimates:14
where m = (μ – σ2/2) , v = σ2, and “n” is the number of samples.  Given “m” and “v”, μ and σ can be calculated 
in a straightforward manner.
For forecasting purposes, to model for the case that the foreign exchange rate on the day of INR-USD 
conversion may be higher than the yearly average, we focused on the yearly maximum foreign exchange time 
series. Based on the 20-year data (1995-2014),15 MLE provided m = 0.0292 and v = 0.00543, resulting in 
μ = 0.0319 and σ = 0.0737. 
3.3 Forecasting foreign exchange rates: Monte-Carlo simulations
For the foreign exchange rate forecast for 2015-2024 (t = 1 to 10 years), we used: FXo (foreign exchange rate 
at the end of the year 2014) = 63, μ = 3.19%, σ = 7.37%. Using the GBM equation (I), we generated 10,000 
different foreign exchange rate paths for every time period – that is, for t = 1 to 10 years. We then created 
histograms – probability distributions – based on each of these 10 sets of 10000 predictions. Figure 1 shows 
the histogram for the year 2024 (for t = 10). 
3.4 Results: Foreign exchange forecast for 2015-2024
On the basis of these histograms, we forecast the long term INR-USD foreign exchange rates for every year 
over 10 years in Table 1. In this paper, we focus on yearly values only. We forecast yearly maximum values of 
foreign exchange rates to ensure that we capture the worst case values of foreign exchange rates and, therefore, 
FXHF net payments, in any year.
14 These are derived as the solution for the maximum of the log-likelihood function of the underlying probability distribution. 
FXti denotes the FX rate at time ti and FXti-1 denotes the FX rate at time ti-1.
15 The time series data has been taken from the year 1995, given that INR has full current account convertibility since then. 
/ ; ( ) /m x n v x m ni i 2R R= = -
 (IV)
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These forecast values have associated probability levels (for example, P50, P95, etc.). For example, in year 
2015, there is 50% probability that the INR-USD exchange rate would be 1 USD = 65.04 INR or lower (the P50 
value), and a 95% probability that the INR-USD exchange rate would be 1 USD = 72.95 INR or lower (the P95 
value). The foreign exchange forecast with an associated probability of 50% is taken as the expected foreign 
exchange rate, which facilitates the calculation of the expected cost of FXHF. The foreign exchange forecasts 
with other levels of probabilities (for example, 95%) facilitate calculations of capital buffer requirements.
Figure 1: Histogram of INR-USD forecast in 2024
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Table 1: Yearly maximum foreign exchange forecast for the period 2015-2024 (in INR)
 Year
Probability Levels
P50 P75 P85 P95
2015 65.04 68.29 70.03 72.95
2016 67.16 71.9 74.45 78.73
2017 69.33 75.35 78.58 84
2018 71.58 78.77 82.63 89.11
2019 73.91 82.22 86.68 94.17
2020 76.31 85.72 90.78 99.27
2021 78.78 89.3 94.45 104.44
2022 81.34 92.97 99.22 109.71
2023 83.98 96.74 103.59 115.1
2024 86.7 100.62 108.09 120.64
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4. The impact of the FXHF: Hedging costs and government cost of support
The FXHF, with an expected cost of 3.5 percentage points, may reduce hedging costs by nearly 50%, the 
delivered cost of renewable energy by up to 19%, and the cost of support by up to 54%. 
In Section 3, we forecasted long-term foreign exchange rate values using a representative stochastic model. 
These forecasted values have associated probability levels. We took the foreign exchange forecast with an 
associated probability of 50% (the P50 level) as the expected foreign exchange rate. Using this expected 
foreign exchange rate, we can now calculate the expected cost of the FXHF, using an example involving a 
local currency power purchase agreement.
In our example, the counterparty takes a 10 year USD 10 million loan in 2015, at a fixed interest rate of 5.5% 
per year. At the initial INR-USD exchange rate (1 USD = 63 INR in 2015), this is equal to INR 630 million. 
At the fixed USD interest rate of 5.5%, the fixed debt payment obligations are $1.33 million per year for 10 
years. To mitigate foreign exchange risk, the counterparty enters into a contract for differences with the FXHF 
at a fixed rate of 1 USD = 63 INR. 
Table 2 shows the payments between the counterparty and the FXHF, including the FXHF net payments. 
The first row represents the yearly fixed payments that the counterparty would make to the FXHF. These 
correspond to the yearly $1.33 million obligations converted to INR using the contract for differences contract 
rate of 1 USD = 63 INR. The third row represents the expected yearly variable payments that the FXHF is 
expected to make to the counterparty, by converting the yearly $1.33 million obligation to INR, and using the 
expected foreign exchange rates (based on P50 levels). The fourth row – the expected yearly net payments – is 
the difference between the first two rows.
The FXHF, with an expected cost of 3.5 percentage points, may reduce hedging costs by nearly 50%.
Table 2: INR payments by the counterparty and the FXHF
Year 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Fixed 
payments from 
counterparty to 
FXHF (A)
        
83.79 
        
83.79 
        
83.79 
        
83.79 
        
83.79 
        
83.79 
        
83.79 
        
83.79 
        
83.79 
        
83.79 
Expected 
foreign 
exchange rate
        
65.04 
        
67.16 
        
69.33 
        
71.58 
        
73.91 
        
76.31 
        
78.78 
        
81.34 
        
83.98 
        
86.70 
Expected 
variable 
payments 
by FXHF to 
counterparty (B)
        
86.50 
        
89.32 
        
92.21 
        
95.20 
        
98.30 
     
101.49 
     
104.78 
     
108.18 
     
111.69 
     
115.31 
Expected net 
payments 
by FXHF to 
counterparty 
(B-A)
         
2.71 
          
5.53 
          
8.42 
        
11.41 
        
14.51 
        
17.70 
        
20.99 
        
24.39 
        
27.90 
        
31.52 
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Assuming an INR risk-free rate of 7.5%, the expected cost to the FXHF (the FXHF expected cost) is the 
Net Present Value (NPV) of the expected yearly net payments (see Row 4 in Table 2). This can be calculated 
as INR 100.39 million, or approximately 16% of the INR 630 million loan and (assuming the typical debt to 
equity ratio of 70:30) approximately 11% of the capital expenditure. At the current capital cost of solar energy 
(INR 7.13 crore/MW), this amounts to approximately INR 7.95 million/MW.
In other words, for our INR 630 million loan, an amount equal to INR 100.39 million, when put in a risk-free 
account, would take care of the expected devaluation of the INR against the USD under our representative 
probabilistic model. Given that an annuity of 3.5% on the original INR 630 million loan has the same net 
present value of INR 100.39 mllion, this indicates that the expected cost of the FXHF is approximately 3.5 
percentage points.   
Depending on policy choice, this FXHF expected cost of 3.5 percentage points can be passed on to the 
counterparty, still resulting in a reduction of approximately 3.5 percentage points in the cost of hedging and, 
therefore, the cost of debt. That is, compared to the cost of currency hedging in the market at 7 percentage 
points, hedging via the FXHF would likely be approximately 50% cheaper. 
The FXHF may reduce the delivered cost of renewable energy by up to 19% and the cost of support by 
up to 54%.
The impact of the FXHF on the delivered cost of renewable energy would depend on policy. The FXHF can 
take one of the following design features:
 • The expected cost of the FXHF is borne by the Government. The rationale for this could be that this is 
similar to an interest subsidy (CPI, 2014). 
 • The expected cost of the FXHF is passed onto the counterparty either as a one-time fee (of INR 100.39 
million) or as annual interest payments (of 3.5 percentage points). 
The FXHF would reduce the delivered cost of renewable energy by reducing the cost of debt and, therefore, 
the cost of capital through a reduction in the cost of debt and an increase in the debt to equity ratio. This would 
then reduce the total cost of support –the total subsidies required – for renewable energy (CPI, 2014).16 We 
calculate the impact on the delivered cost of renewable energy as well as the cost of support using our cash-
flow models (CPI, 2014). When the expected cost of the FXHF is passed onto the counterparty, under a local 
currency power purchase agreement, it is passed on as an increase in the levelized cost of electricity; whereas, 
under a hard currency power purchase agreement, it is passed on as a surcharge on the consumers.
We find that, if the FXHF expected cost is borne by the government, the cost of debt for the counterparty can 
be reduced by 7 percentage points and, therefore, the delivered cost of renewable energy by 19% and the cost 
of support by 54%. However, if the expected cost of the FXHF is passed onto the counterparty, the FXHF can 
reduce the cost of debt by approximately 3.5 (or 7) percentage points if the power purchase agreement is local 
currency (or hard currency) and, therefore, the delivered cost of renewable energy by approximately 9% and 
the cost of support by 33%.17 The gains typically arise due to substituting expensive equity with cheaper debt, 
especially as projects optimize leverage (CPI, 2014).
16 This includes: The feed-in premium embedded in a renewable energy power purchase agreement; other subsidies such as an 
interest subsidy; and, changes in taxes.
17 The reduction in the delivered cost of renewable energy is similar for local and hard currency power purchase agreements. 
In the former, the impact on the cost of debt is reflected in the levelized cost for the project; and in the latter, the impact is a 
direct surcharge of INR 0.64/kWh or 9.8% of unsubsidized tariff.
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5. Risk considerations in an FXHF
To safeguard the FXHF against unexpected and extreme foreign exchange rate movements, a capital 
buffer is one option to consider; achieving India’s sovereign rating of BBB- would require this buffer to 
be approximately 30% of the size of the loan; and, the market cost of maintaining this buffer could be 
as high as 79% of the expected cost.
We note that the FXHF, as discussed so far, is similar to ones discussed in government announcements.18 
However, this mechanism examines only the expected movements in foreign exchange rates, and ignores two 
key issues. 
First, what would happen in the presence of unexpected and extreme movements in foreign exchange rates? 
In this case, even if the FXHF is sized to take care of expected movements, the whole FXHF may be wiped 
out due to unexpected and extreme movement in any particular year. Second, the large difference between the 
FXHF expected cost and the cost of a market hedge – 3.5 percentage points in our example – raises questions 
about what causes the difference, and the role of market risk (due to volatility of foreign exchange movements). 
A capital buffer is one option to cover unexpected and extreme movements in foreign exchange rates.
The expected cost to the FXHF takes into account the likely foreign exchange rate movements. But, unexpected 
and extreme movements in foreign exchange rates can put a severe strain on the FXHF, potentially causing it 
to default, thereby putting the counterparty at risk. 
One way to deal with this is for the guarantor (the government) to take the risk of unexpected and extreme 
foreign exchange movements in the form of a sovereign guarantee – either explicit or implicit. One potential 
option for this is a capital buffer in a standalone facility, which may be funded by the National Clean Energy 
Fund (NCEF), for example. 
The capital buffer would be the amount needed beyond the FXHF expected net payment to ensure that the 10 
year default probability of the FXHF is below a pre-specified threshold. This capital buffer requirement would 
depend on the risk exposure that the FXHF is designed to cover – for example, the capital buffer requirement 
to provide a lower probability of default (for example, 5%) would be higher than the capital buffer requirement 
to provide a higher probability of default (for example, 10%).
18 http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/power/power-minister-piyush-goyal-eyes-bidding-in-dollar-to-cut-
solar-tariff/articleshow/46684838.cms 
Table 3: Impact of the FXHF on the delivered cost of renewable energy
Power Purchase Agreement Scenario Net cost of debt to project developer
Approximate reduction in delivered 
cost of renewable energy
Local currency
Expected cost of the FXHF is 
borne by the government 5.50% 19%
Expected cost of the FXHF is 
passed onto the project developer 9.00% 9%
Hard currency
Expected cost of the FXHF is 
borne by the government 5.50% 19%
Expected cost of the FXHF is 
passed onto to the off-taker 5.50% 9.8%
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Table 4 provides the cumulative capital buffer requirements for different 10 year probabilities of default. It is 
evident that the capital buffer requirement is zero if the 10 year probability of default is 50% or higher, and 
that the capital buffer requirement grows as the 10 year probability of default goes down. 
The capital buffer is assumed to be invested in a risk-free INR security and, therefore when needed, may 
help address unexpected and extreme movements in foreign exchange rates. Given expected movements in 
currency, if funded by a corpus such as the NCEF, the capital buffer may not have direct cost implications. It 
is possible, however, to fund the capital buffer by levying a surcharge (under a hard currency power purchase 
agreement) with direct cost implications, which we explicitly calculate. 
A capital buffer of approximately one-third the size of the underlying loan may help ensure that the 
FXHF achieves India’s sovereign rating.
Assuming this default probability to be less than 5% over the entire tenor of the FXHF (10 years), the required 
cumulative capital buffer is INR 180.04 million – about 1.8 times the expected cost, about 29% of the size 
of the loan, about 20% of capital expenditure at current capital cost for solar, and about a INR 1.16/kWh 
surcharge. That is, the size of the FXHF would be INR 280.43 million – about 2.8 times the expected cost, 
about 45% of the size of the loan, and about 30% of the capital expenditure.
Based on cumulative default rates of globally rated bonds, for a 10 year probability of default less than 5% (at 
P95 level of risk coverage), this FXHF would achieve a credit rating equivalent to India’s current sovereign 
rating of BBB- (see Table 6 in the Appendix). This is commonly known as breaching the sovereign ceiling, 
given that risk coverage beyond this level would not be necessary or required.
The difference between the cost of currency hedging in the market and the FXHF expected cost is 
largely due to the cost of maintaining a capital buffer. 
The difference between the market cost of hedging and the FXHF expected cost can be attributed to a 
combination of factors including: risk-premium, liquidity-premium,19 and regulation costs. 
19 The market charges a liquidity premium for a cross currency swap, which can be derived from the cross currency basis 
spread.
Table 4: Capital buffer requirements for a standalone facility with different probabilities of default
Probability of 
default of the 
FXHF
Cumulative capital 
buffer requirement 
for 10 years 
(as % of loan) 
Cumulative capital 
buffer requirement 
for 10 years 
(as % of capex) 
Cumulative capital 
buffer requirement 
for 10 years 
(INR million/MW) 
Surcharge in a hard currency power 
purchase agreement 
(INR/kWh) (% of unsubsidized tariff)
50% 0 0 0 0 0%
25% 11.72% 8.20% 5.84 0.47 6.56%
15% 17.95% 12.56% 8.95 0.73 10.20%
5% 28.58% 20.00% 14.26 1.16 16.20%
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Risk-premium essentially means that the market views FX hedging as a risky activity due to the volatility of 
FX rate movements and, therefore, the market price of the hedge includes a premium to compensate investors 
for the “market” risk they are taking; in a way very similar to other risky investments, such as equities. The 
risk-premium can also be thought of as the premium demanded, over and above the FXHF expected cost, to 
keep the capital buffer that covers for unexpected and extreme movements in foreign exchange rates. 
Liquidity-premium would exist in illiquid FX markets, where investors may demand a premium for holding 
an illiquid asset. Regulation costs are related to costs due to regulations, such as Basel III capital requirements. 
For example, Basel III’s credit value adjustment charge (CVA) can add up to 55 basis points to the cost of a 10 
year cross currency swap.20 However, the INR-USD hedge market is fairly liquid up to 10 years and, therefore, 
a significant liquidity premium is unlikely. 
We calculate the risk-premium using standard FX option-pricing theory. We first find the expected cost of 
providing a hedge. This includes the risk-premium and, therefore, we call this the expected market risk 
adjusted cost of providing a currency hedge. We then subtract the FXHF expected cost of 3.5 percentage 
points from the expected market risk adjusted cost to find the risk-premium.
We calculate the expected market risk adjusted cost as 6.26 percentage points and, therefore, the risk-premium as 
2.76 percentage points. This largely explains the difference between the FXHF expected cost of 3.5 percentage 
points and the cost of currency hedging in the market of 7 percentage points. The remaining difference of 0.74 
percentage points can be attributed to liquidity premium and transaction costs related to regulation cost.
To find the risk-adjusted market cost, we model the contract for differences between the FXHF and the 
counterparty as a series of pairs of call and put options at the strike price equal to the fixed foreign exchange 
rate – at 1 USD = 63 INR. In each of the ten call-put pairs, at the strike price of 1 USD = 63 INR, the FXHF 
would sell the counterparty a call option –  the option to buy 1 USD at 63 INR – and the counterparty would 
sell the FXHF a put option –  the option to sell 1 USD at 63 INR. 
The difference between the costs of the call and put options in any particular year, which would be calculated 
using option-pricing theory, would be the expected risk-adjusted market cost for the contract for that year. The 
net present value of all the yearly expected risk-adjusted market costs would then provide the expected risk-
adjusted market cost for series of pair of options. We use the currency option pricing formulae provided by 
Biger and Hull (1983) to calculate the cost of call and put foreign exchange options, as follows: 
20 http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/feature/2191990/risk-25-how-basel-iii-is-turning-borders-into-barriers 
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where,
1. S: spot price of one unit of foreign currency (USD) on the day of contract – in this case S = INR 63
2. σ2: instantaneous variance of the return on foreign currency (USD) holding – in this case σ = 7.37% 
3. X: exercise price to purchase one unit of foreign currency (USD) – in this case X = INR 63
4. T: exercise date – in this case, T = 1, 2, … , 10
5. r: risk-free rate of interest in the home country (India) – in this case r = 7.5%
6. r* : risk-free rate of interest in the foreign country (US) – in this case r* = 2%
Using equation (V and VI), Table 5 provides the costs of the call (Row 2) and put (Row 3) options for  yearly 1 
USD = 63 INR options. The net present value (at the risk-free rate of 7.5%) of the annual differences between 
the costs of these 1 USD = 63 INR call and put options is INR 138.46. We then calculate the corresponding 
net costs for the USD 10 million loan discussed earlier, given that the USD 10 million loan would require ten 
annual payments of USD 1.33 million. Thus, we calculate the net cost of providing the ten pairs of options for 
the contract for differences as the net present value of the ten yearly cash flows at the INR risk-free rate as INR 
184.16 (= 138.46 * 1.33) million. 
This INR 184.16 million is equivalent to a 10 year annuity at 6.26 percentage points per year on the original loan 
amount of INR 630 million. This is essentially the expected market risk adjusted cost, and is 2.76 percentage 
points higher than the FXHF expected cost of 3.5 percentage points. That is, the risk-premium discovered by 
option pricing theory is 2.76 percentage points. 
6. Conclusion
Increasing availability of low-cost, long-term debt will be crucial to achieving India’s ambitious renewable 
energy targets in a cost-effective manner. Cheap foreign debt is a promising source of more capital. However, 
it requires currency hedging, which can be expensive enough to negate almost all the benefits of foreign debt. 
A government-sponsored currency hedging mechanism is potentially cheaper than a market-based mechanism, 
and, therefore, of interest to Indian policymakers. 
In this paper, we begin to examine a possible design of a government-sponsored currency hedging facility 
(FXHF), along with associated cost and risk implications. We analyse the FXHF using a representative 
stochastic model of foreign exchange rates. Our analysis reveals that the expected cost to provide a 10 year 
currency hedge via the FXHF is 3.5 percentage points, approximately 50% of the market cost of providing this 
hedge, or 16% of the underlying loan amount. 
If the expected cost of the FXHF is borne by the government, the cost of debt can be reduced by 7 percentage 
points, the delivered cost of renewable energy by 19%, and the cost of government support by 54%. If the 
expected cost of the FXHF is passed onto the developer, the cost of debt can be reduced by 3.5 percentage 
points, the delivered cost of renewable energy by 9%, and the cost of government support by 33%.
Table 5: Cost of yearly 1 USD = 63 INR call and put options
Time to maturity 
(in years) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 Cost of a 1 USD 
Call option 3.89 6.75 9.34 11.71 13.86 15.81 17.58 19.16 20.58 21.84 
 Cost of a 1 USD 
Put option 0.58 0.45 0.32 0.23 0.16 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.03 
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However, the government should be aware of the risk exposure of the FXHF. One way to protect against the 
risk of unexpected and extreme movements in foreign exchange rates, and to ensure that the FXHF does not 
default, is a capital buffer. For example, for the FXHF to achieve India’s current sovereign rating of BBB-, the 
cumulative capital buffer requirement for 10 years is almost 30% of the underlying loan amount. 
The FXHF discussed in this paper can serve as a reference for currency hedging facilities proposed by the 
government and other institutions, such as multilateral development banks. However, in addition to adequate 
risk and cost considerations, the FXHF would also need to incorporate clear guidelines and rules, including 
clear eligibility criteria for project selection and a suitable governance model. 
A more detailed design of an FXHF would also require additional analysis, including: assessing additional 
stochastic processes for the USD-INR foreign exchange rate forecast modelling; assessing the benefits of 
using stochastic volatility (Heston, 1993) i.e. volatility of volatility; assessing the effect of the FXHF on 
mobilization of additional foreign debt; and assessing distortive incentive effects of the FXHF in the currency 
hedging market.
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Appendix
Table 6: Average cumulative (10 years’) default rates of bonds
Global rating Average cumulative (10 years) default rates
AAA 0.78%
AA 0.86%
A 1.77%
BBB 4.88%
BB 15.59%
B 28.70%
CCC/C 51.65%
Source: Standard & Poor’s Annual U.S. Corporate Default Study And Rating Transitions
